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COIENTS
THE SURETY'S RIGHTS TO MONEY RETAINED FROM
PAYMENTS MADE ON A PUBLIC CONTRACT
It is customary and proper for federal, state and municipal agencies in award-
ing construction contracts,' to stipulate that percentages of the contractor's
current earnings be retained by public authorities until completion of the con-
tract. When the contractor has failed to complete the contract, or having com-
pleted it, has failed to pay his creditors, conflicting claims always arise upon the
distribution of these retained proceeds. The conflicting rules of federal and state
administration of such proceeds have created considerable confusion in this area
of the law.
I. INTRoDUCTIoN
A. Rights and Obligations of the Contractor
A contractor upon undertaking a public contract, in return for his right to
collect the contract price, promises to complete the work within a stipulated time
and in an acceptable manner. The public's interest in his performance is secured
to some degree by the standard contract provision2 that upon default the con-
tractor shall be liable for any excess costs incurred in completing the contract 0
To guard against these potential damages, the contractee usually retains a per-
centage of the money earned on the contract.4 This provision for retention of
funds has been said to be for the protection of the owner, i.e., in a public contract,
the public body.5 Such provisions, however, in actuality, are probably as much
for the indemnity of the contractor's surety as for the public body itself.0
One of the prerequisites to an award of a public contract is that the contractor
furnish a bond. This affords the public body further protection against the
contractor's default. Usually, the bond is required by statute,7 but such statutory
1. Public work consists of construction of any type contracted for by the Government
(at any level) or by any agency thereof authorized to order such performance in the name
of the people represented by such Government.
2. See, e.g., U.S. Standard Form 23A, 26 Fed. Reg. 1050-51 (1961).
3. See, e.g., U.S. Standard Form 23A(S), 26 Fed. Reg. 1050 (1961). If the contractor,
without excuse, refuses or fails to complete the work within the specified time, he and his
surety shall be liable for any resulting damage to the Government. See also Palmes, Damages
in Government Construction Contracts, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 621 (1957).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Standard Form 23A(7)(c), 26 Fed. Reg. 1050 (1961). A federal con-
struction contractor receives monthly progress payments based on estimates made and
approved by the contracting officer. From these payments ten per cent of the estimated
amount must be retained until final completion and acceptance of the contract work.
5. See Annot., 107 A.L.R. 960 (1937).
6. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1S96); Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Con-
tinental Cas. Co., 183 F. Supp. 47S, 4S3-84 (WI). Pa. 1960).
7. E.g., 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a (195); cf. Ej. Eddy, Inc. v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co., 265 N.Y. 276, 192 N.E. 410 (1934); Schmidt v. Duggan, 15 Misc. 2d 103,
180 N.Y.S.2d 679 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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authority is not necessary.8 The bond is, of course, conditioned upon timely
performance of the contract,9 and often upon payment of the contractor's
creditors. 0
The federal government's interest as contractee is protected by the pro-
visions of the Miller Act,11 which require the contractor to post both per-
formance' 2 and payment bonds.13 The performance bond compels the surety, in
the event of the contractor's default, either to take over and perform the
remainder of the contract or, in the alternative, to pay any excess costs caused
by the default. 14 The payment bond, on the other hand, is for the protection of
those supplying labor and materials on the main contract. There are, however,
neither new contractual rights created nor new contractual duties imposed upon
the federal government by the Miller Act.
B. Rights and Obligations of the Surety
A surety's right to retained contract funds arises when the contractor de-
faults and the surety must complete the contract. If the contractor has already
been paid, the surety will then either seek reimbursement under a contract of
indemnification or enforce the assignment (originally made by the contractor as
partial consideration for the bond) of moneys due or to become due under the
8. See Annot., 11 L.R.A. (ns.) 1028 (1908); Annot., 46 L.R.A. (n.s.) 325 (1913).
9. See Annot., 77 A.L.R. 191 (1932); Annot., 118 A.L.R. 97 (1939). See, e.g., 49 Stat.
793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a) (1) (1958). This section requires a performance bond
"before any contract, exceeding $2,000 in amount, for the construction, alteration, or repair
of any public building or public work of the United States is awarded to any person .... "
It also "secures the performance and fulfillment of all the undertakings, covenants, terms,
conditions and agreements contained in the contract." 32 C.F.R. § 10.101-2 (1961). See
generally Byrne & Costello, The Evolution of Coverage Under the Miller Act, 28 Fordham L.
Rev. 287 (1959); Haas, The Corporate Surety and Public Construction Bonds, 25 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 206 (1957).
10. See, e.g., 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(2) (1958).
11. 49 Stat. 793-94 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 270a-d (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
12. See, e.g.,49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(2) (1958).
13. 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(2) (1958). The payment bond protects
all persons in a direct contractual relationship with both the contractor and the subcon-
tractor. The Supreme Court defined a subcontractor as "one who performs for and takes
from the prime contractor a specific part of the labor or material requirements of the
original contract . . . ." Clifford F. MacEvoy Co. v. United States ex rel. Calvin Tomkins
Co., 322 U.S. 102, 109 (1944). To be protected under the act, a materialman or subcontractor
on the second tier must deal with a subcontractor as defined above. The prevalent view is
that "subcontractor" is limited to persons in a direct contractual relationship with the
contractor, thereby excluding from protection materialmen and subcontractors on the third
tier. Elmer v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 275 F.2d 89 (5th Cir. 1960); United States
ex rel. Jonathan Handy Co. v. Deschenes Constr. Co., 188 F. Supp. 270 (D. Mass. 1960).
14. See note 12 supra.
15. Cf. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947). A contractor under
U.S. Standard Form 23A, 26 Fed. Reg. 1050-51 (1961) does not promise the Government
promptly to pay materialmen, nor does the Government become liable to the materialmen
or a payment bond surety under an express or implied contract. Id. at 240-41.
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primary contract. This contractual right of the surety was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in the leading case of Prairie State Banh v. United
States' 6 where it was made clear that the surety was not just the shadow of the
contractor, but rather it had independent contractual interests which must be
protected.
Since the surety is compelled to perform the contract in the event of the
contractor's default, under the doctrine of subrogation, this obligation creates
in it rights and privileges normally enjoyed by the public body. Thus, the public
body cannot act in such a way as to jeopardize the surety's rights without
releasing the surety from its obligations under the bond.17 Since the public
body had the right to retain percentages of the contract price to secure per-
formance, the surety acquires the same right to the withheld funds.18 The
public body, therefore, cannot pay the retained percentages to the contractor
after the contractor's default without affecting the surety's right in the fund. 0
Likewise, if a payment bond surety satisfies the contractor's obligation to
pay materialmen and laborers, it becomes subrogated to the rights and remedies
accorded those persons against the public body.20 The final basis for a surety's
claim is the new contract entered into by the surety and the public body
when the surety is compelled to take over and complete the contract under the
terms of the performance bond.2 '
II. PRIORITY OP PARTIES TO RETAINED PERCENTAGES
A. Surety v. The Federal Government
1. Contracts Governed by the Miller Act-Federal Contracts
The federal government is usually a stakeholder which merely retains re-
quired percentages of contract funds and distributes them to the legitimate
claimants at the appropriate time. If instead of being a mere stakeholder, the
Government is a claimant in its own right, the question of the Government's
right to a set off is raised.
United States v. Mnsey Trust Co. -22 posed this question of priority to retained
percentages as between a contractor's surety and the federal government. Before
16. 164 U.S. 227 (lS96).
17. St. John's College, Fordham v. Aetna Indem. Co., 201 N.Y. 335, 94 N.E. 994 (1911).
See Kerrigan, The Surety as Competing Claimant to Contract Funds, 24 Ins. Counael J.
34 (1957).
18. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 US. 227 (1896).
19. United States v. Kings County Iron Works, Inc., 224 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1955); Karno-
Smith Co. v. Maloney, 112 F.2d 690 (3d Cir. 1940).
20. United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910); !:c note 19
supra. See also Equitable Sur. Co. v. United States ex rel. Alcillan, 234 U.S. 44S, 455
(1914).
21. The "take-over" is performed under a new contract with the Government wherdn
it normally promises to pay the surety's completion costs from retained percentagia and
unpaid estimates. See Kerrigan, Recent Developments in the Contest Betv.een the United
States and the Surety for Contract Funds, 24 Ins. Counsel J. 104 (1957).
22. 332 U.S. 234 (1947). See also Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259
F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958).
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the decision in Munsey, in most instances, statutory rules governed the right
to a set off.23 It could be said as a general rule that an owner, or in this case,
the Government, would not be permitted to set off extraneous debts due from
the contractor24 unless the debt arose out of the immediate contract.25
In Munsey, the surety, after completion and acceptance of the work by the
Government, was required to pay the contractor's debts owing to subcontractors
and materialmen under a payment bond. Later, the same contractor failed to
execute a contract for additional work on another site after his bid was accepted
by the Government. The Government set off against the retained percentages of
the previous contract, the damages incurred as a result of this refusal to per-
form. The surety's action was based on the theory that it became subrogated
to the retained percentages by reason of its performance under the bond. The
Supreme Court held that with respect to the withheld and unappropriated per-
centages of progress payments, the Government is not a mere general creditor
but rather a secured creditor entitled to withhold what it owes the contractor
until its claims against him are first satisfied .2  Thus, the Government has the
right, belonging to every creditor, of applying retained moneys in its possession
towards payment of debts due it.27
Accordingly, the Government has been permitted to set off damages arising
under a separate contract 28 and even delinquent taxes2D of the contractor. The
reasoning behind such decisions is that the retained funds never became due
because the Government had the right to set off other debts, and, hence, the
surety never became entitled to the funds. Therefore, the surety could not be
subrogated to the position of the government-creditor making the set off.80
The court of claims in Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. United States31 extended
the Munsey rule to permit the United States to set off damages even when the
surety's claim is based on a performance bond. The fallacy of this extension,
however, although pointed out previously by the same court in Maryland Cas.
Co. v. United States,32 was apparently disregarded. The court in Maryland Cas.
23. Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U.S. 499, 507 (1892).
24. Supreme Liberty Life Ins. Co. v. Ridley's Adm'r., 261 Ky. 403, 87 S.W.2d 940
(1935) ; Bradley v. Thompson Smith's Sons, 98 Mich. 449, 57 N.W. 576 (1894) ; Abrahams v.
Wilson, 134 Pa. Super. 297, 3 A.2d 1016 (1939). See 4 Corbin, Contracts §§ 896-97 (1951);
see also Annot., 46 A.L.R. 393 (1927).
25. Ibid.
26. 332 U.S. at 240.
27. McKnight v. United States, 98 U.S. 179 (1878).
28. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
29. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958). Contra,
Central Bank v. United States, 345 U.S. 639 (1953). The Court held that withholding tax
claims asserted by the Government where the contractor failed to perform statutory rather
than contractual obligations were independent of the contract and could not be set off.
30. See United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947) ; Massachusetts Bonding
& Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958).
31. 97 F. Supp. 829 (Ct. Cl. 1951), followed in General Cas. Co. v. United States, 127
F. Supp. 805 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938 (1955).
32. 53 F. Supp. 436 (Ct. Cl. 1944). See also New York Cas. Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp.
473 (N.D. Ill. 1944).
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Co. stated that if the Government were permitted to set off extraneous debts
against a surety who had completed work under a performance bond, no surety
would risk completion of a government contract. For, if the Government com-
pleted the work, the surety's obligation would be limited to the difference be-
tween the actual cost of completion and the contract price; whereas if the
surety completed the contract, it would have to pay the cost of completion
with no assurance that it could obtain the funds due on the original contract.p
The error in the rationale of Standard Acc. Ins. Co.,34 was corrected by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Massachusetts Bond-
ing & Ins. Co. v. New York. 35 There the contractor, prior to being adjudicated
bankrupt, entered into a construction contract with the United States. In
compliance with the Miller Act,36 he furnished both performance and payment
bonds on which the Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Company was the
surety. In consideration thereof, the contractor assigned to the surety, effec-
tive upon default, all deferred payments or retained percentages that might be
due and payable on the contract. The surety had to assist the contractor in
the performance of the contract. Meanwhile, the contractor had become de-
linquent in the payment of his taiges. The United States set off the taxes
due it against a progress payment owed to the contractor while the surety,
on the other hand, claimed it was entitled to become subrogated to the position
of the Government. The court chose to follow the Munsey doctrine2 7 holding
that neither the bankrupt contractor nor the surety ever became entitled to
these funds and, thus, there was nothing for the surety to own. However,
when referring to the money paid by the Government under the contract,
the court held that on principles of subrogation, the surety had a prior claim
to this sum. The court continued:
It is settled law that a surety which undertakes to complete a construction contract
after its principal has defaulted... becomes entitled to payments due the principal....
This right to "first" priority attaches not only to moneys due the principal at the
time of default, but to so-called "unearned" moneys which arise from the surety's
activities in completing the contract....as
Thus, Massachusetts Bonding would exclude the Mnsey doctrine from the
situation where a surety completes work under a performance bond and gives
the surety priority to retained percentages earned on the contract. Of course,
in the absence of a government set off, a surety which completes the contractor's
obligations will be subrogated to the contractor's right to the progress pay-
ments.39
33. See Rudolph, Performance Bond Servicing of Government Contracts, 19 Ins. Counzel
J. 171 (1952).
34. 97 F. Supp. 829 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
35. 259 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1958).
36. 49 Stat. 793-94 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 270a-d (195S) (Supp. II, 1959-
1961).
37. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
38. 259 F.2d at 37.
39. See American Sur. Co. v. Sampsel]l, 327 U.S. 269 (1946); Henningien v. United
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2. Contracts Not Governed by the Miller Act-State and Municipal Contracts
When the Miller Act4" is not applicable, a different result would probably be
reached in a contest between a surety and the public body. The leading case in
this respect is United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Triborough Bridge Authority.41
That case involved a dispute over the right to funds withheld by the Bridge
Authority. The contestants were a surety who had completed a contract under
a performance bond and the United States which asserted a claim for delinquent
taxes. The surety became obligated in December of 1941 to pay moneys due
subcontractors for labor and materials expended in performing the contract. At
that time, the Bridge Authority held $108,904, representing the final payment
due under the contract. In June, 1942, the United States filed a notice of lien
for taxes due for the years 1939 through 1941. Both parties sought the satisfac-
tion of their respective claims from the fund retained and held by the Au-
thority.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the surety
succeeded-under principles of subrogation-to all rights which .. . [the] Authority
might have against the contractor, including that of withholding money due the
contractor and of applying it to the payment of unsatisfied claims for labor and
materials furnished.42
.The court continued that the "equity in favor of the surety company arose
at the time of the giving of its bond" 43 and "the right became available when
the surety company completed the work . . . . '44 Applying this rule, it
held the surety's equitable lien created in July of 1940 was prior and superior
to the United States' lien which did not come into being until 1942. Further-
more, since the contractor had no rights to the money as long as claims for labor
and materials were unpaid, he had no property interest therein on which the
United States could place a lien.45
The court of appeals was careful to note46 that this decision was not contrary
to the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Munsey Trust Co.47 This
statement, however, is not absolutely correct, for if the surety's equity arises
when the bond is executed and attaches when the surety completes the contract
after the contractor's default, this equity is superior to any claim the public
body may have against the contractor other than a claim arising out of the
immediate contract which the retained percentages secure. Thus, following the
States Fid. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908); Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164
U.S. 227 (1896).
40. See note 36 supra.
41. 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947).
42. Id. at 35, 74 N.E.2d at 227.
43. Id. at 36, 74 N.E.2d at 227. See Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States
Fid. & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y. 159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934).
44. 297 N.Y. at 36, 74 N.E.2d at 227. See Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S.
at 232.
45. 297 N.Y. at 37, 74 N.E.2d at 228.
46. Id. at 36, 74 N.E.2d at 227.
47. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
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Triborouzgh reasoning to its logical conclusion, the public body's right to set off
against the retained funds would be limited to claims arising directly out of the
immediate contract, for the surety's equity would be prior to any claim for ex-
traneous debts made by the Government after execution of the bond. 9
3. Summation: Surety v. The Federal Government
In Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Port of New York Avthority;1 a contractor's
surety was accorded priority to withheld funds over the federal government's
tax lien. This decision thus endorsed the ruling of the New York Court of
Appeals in the Triborough Bridge caserO and, for the time being, reinforced the
surety's priority over a government tax lien.
Presently, it is correct to say that the rule set forth in United States v. 21Munsey
Trust Co.31 is restricted to situations where the United States is the contractee
and it sets off debts owing from the contractor against funds in its hands
retained from the contract proceeds. This right to set off against funds claimed
by the contractor's performing surety is further limited to a payment bond
surety.52 If the surety completes the contract in compliance with the provisions
of the performance bond, the right to set off is not available to the Govern-
ment.53 Finally, if the Government is neither contractee nor stakeholder but
rather an "intervenor" seeking delinquent taxes, the surety will prevail on the
basis of Triborough Bridge."
B. Surety v. Subcontractor
1. Contracts Governed by the Miller Act-Federal Contracts
Under a private construction contract,ra a laborer's or materialman's (the
subcontractor) right to payment is secured by a mechanic's lien.cO No such
protection, however, is afforded these persons where federal buildings are in-
volved, for such property is immune to lien.57 Under the standard federal con-
48. See United States v. Mlunsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 243, citing 4 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence § 1419, at 1075 (5th ed. 1941).
49. 132 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Community School Dist. v. Employers
Mut. Cas. Co., 194 F. Supp. 733, 745 (N.D. Iowa 1961); Randall v. United Home Bank &
Trust Co., 190 F. Supp. 319, 339 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
50. 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226.
51. 332 U.S. 234 (1947).
52. See Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. New York, 259 F.2d 33, 33 (2d Cir. 1953),
where the court held that the surety on a performance bond, on the principles of subrogation,
had a prior claim to the retained fund.
53. Ibid.
54. 297 N.Y. 31, 74 N.E.2d 226 (1947); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Port of New
York Authority, 132 F. Supp. 671 (SMD.N.Y. 1960).
55. See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R. 21 (1932); Annot., 113 A.L.R. 57 (1939).
56. The lien is created by state statutes. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. § 1131; Fla. Stat. Ann.
§ 34.02 (1943); N.Y. Lien Law § 3.
57. United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 21S U.S. 452 (1910). Sce Equitable
Sur. Co. v. United States ex rel. Ac16illan, 234 US. 443, 455 (1914).
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struction contract,50 the contractor is not subjected to liability for failure to
pay materialmen and laborers50 and, thus, their claims must depend on an
independent contract. Although no contractual privity exists between material-
men or laborers and the Government, 60 most courts concede that the latter has
an "equitable" obligation to prefer unpaid materialmen or laborers in the
distribution of retained contract proceeds. 01 This "equitable" obligation, how-
ever, is not dependent on the Miller Act. 2
Perhaps the most significant feature of the Miller Act 3 was its mollifying
effect on the problems facing subcontractors on federal contracts. Prior to its
enactment, and in the absence of a special provision in the construction bond on
the main contract, the surety had been held entitled to the retained percentages
of progress payments as against laborers and materialmen.0 4 Under the act, how-
ever, the general contractor is required to execute a payment bond prior to the
award of contract 65 for the protection of those supplying labor and materials. As
noted above, a payment bond surety's right to the retained proceeds is grounded
on principles of subrogation. The surety, however, is not subrogated to the
rights of the contractor until all creditors' claims are fully satisfied.00 There-
fore, materialmen and laborers have rights in the retained moneys superior to
all but the Government since their claims must first be satisfied before the
surety's rights mature. 67 Consequently, the Miller Act's requirement of a pay-
ment bond affords subcontractors the protection ordinarily provided by the
mechanic's lien,08 and, in effect, establishes their priority over the surety.
2. Contracts Not Governed by the Miller Act-State and Municipal Contracts
State and municipal construction projects, like federal improvements, are
also exempt from the mechanic's lien.0 9 Most states, however, give the sub-
-contractor some protection by permitting a mechanic's lien to attach to funds
due on public works, 70 while the improvements themselves remain immune. 71 In
New York, the subcontractor's lien is limited to that part of the contract price
58. See U.S. Standard Form 23A, 26 Fed. Reg. 1050-51 (1961).
59. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 240 (1947).
60. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Phoenix Indem. Co. v.
Earle, 218 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1955) ; National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381
-(Ct. CI.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 902 (1955).
61. See, e.g., Henningsen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
62. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947).
63. 49 Stat. 793-94 (1935), as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 270a-d (1958) (Supp. III, 1959-1961).
64. See, e.g., Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896); Arrow Iron
Works, Inc. v. Greene, 260 N.Y. 330, 183 N.E. 515 (1932).
65. 49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(2) (1958).
66. American Sur. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Mfg. Co., 296 U.S. 133, 137 (1935).
67. Ibid.
68. United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947).
69. See Annot., 26 A.L.R. 326 (1923).
70. See, e.g., N.Y. Lien Law § 5; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2 A: 44-128 (1952); Tex. Rev. Clv.
:Stat. Ann. art. 5472(a) (1958).
71. See note 68 supra.
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due and owing the contractor at the time the notice of lien is given plus any
amount that may become due thereafter 2
In addition to lien laws, most states have followed the pattern of the federal
government in requiring payment or performance bonds, or both, as a pre-
requisite to the awarding of a public construction contract. 3 Some jurisdictions,
including New York, require the bond claimant to be eligible for a mechanic's
lien before being entitled to any recovery against the surety."4 The New
York statute provides, however, that if a lien would be invalid because of the
technicality that the "amount due" is insufficient, the claimant may still recover
from the surety if the lien is otherwise valid.7
For further protection of the public body, New York, like the federal gov-
ernment, requires a retention clause in all public construction contracts au-
thorizing the contractee to retain percentages of the progress payments earned
by the contractor.70 This retained fund secures full completion of the con-
tractor's obligations. Again, the problem arises as to the priority between unpaid
subcontractors, materialmen and the surety to such retained funds in the event
of default by the contractor.
In a contest for priority in New York, the same result would be reached as
under the Miller Act, although the courts have not been nearly as concise in
their holdings. In Laski v. State,77 the appellate division held that a lienor
who furnished materials to the contractor, and to that extent diminished
the expense with which the surety would otherwise have been burdened, had a
lien superior to the surety upon the contractor's default."8
This order of priority was weakened, however, by the court of appeals in
Arrow Iron Works, Inw. v. Greene0 when it stated that
in giving our approval to the [Laski] decision by an affirmance without opinion, we
certainly did not intend ... to countenance the proposition that the stated order...
[of priority, e.g., (1) lienor, (2) the surety, and (3) the assignee] was the order of
priority generally to be observedsO
72. N.Y. Lien Law § 4. Nassau Suffolk Lumber & Supply Corp. v. Bruce, 177 Mlisc.
825, 31 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Nassau County Ct. 1941). Generally, the contractor is not compelled
to pay more. N.Y. Lien Law § 4.
73. Only Kentucky, Maine and South Carolina lack express surety bond legislation for
public works. Haas, The Corporate Surety and Public Construction Bonds, 25 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 206, 207 n.5 (1957).
74. See, e.g., N.Y. State Fin. Law § 137 which provides: "In order to secure any rights
and benefits conferred herein, laborers having claims for unpaid wages shall file and enforce
a wage claim as provided by the Labor Law or shall file and enforce a mechanic's lien
pursuant to the provisions of the lien law, and a materiahlman, in order to secure any such
rights and benefits, shall file and enforce a mechanic's lien pursuant to the provisions of the
lien law."
75. N.Y. State Fin. Law § 137. See also note 63 supra.
76. See, e.g., N.Y. State Fin. Law § 139.
77. 217 App. Div. 420, 217 N.Y. Supp. 43 (3d Dep't 1926), aff'd mem., 246 N.Y. 569,
159 N.E. 655 (1927).
78. Ibid.
79. 260 N.Y. 330, 133 N.E. 515 (1932).
SO. Id. at 341-42, 133 N.E. at 513.
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In this case, a contractor entered into a contract with the State of New York.
Thirteen months later, he abandoned the contract, having been paid eighty-five
per cent of the contract price with the balance being retained by the State.
The surety took over and completed the contract. Upon completion there be-
came due and payable $16,254.39, consisting of retained percentages for work
performed by the contractor prior to abandonment, and $10,904.06, representing
the difference between the sum earned by the contractor and the full contract
price. The court labeled the retained percentages "earned" moneys and the
balance "unearned." 8'
Prior to the contractor's default, Arrow Iron Works, a supplier, filed a notice
of lien against the funds due on the contract,8 2 but the contractor procured an
order discharging this lien 3 by depositing a designated sum with the court.
Upon foreclosure of the lien, the deposit given by the contractor was insufficient
to satisfy the claim plus the expenses incidental thereto. The appellate division,
affirming the lower court, held that the balance due the lienor, Arrow, would be
paid out of both "earned" and "unearned" moneys due on the contract.8 4 The
court of appeals modified the appellate division's holding that the surety was
entitled, above all lienors, to the balance of the contract price unearned at the
time of abandonment85 and stated that where
materials and labor, of the value stated in a lien, had been supplied by ... [the sub-
contractors] and had in part created the fund of . . . "retained percentages" . . . the
surety should give way to the lienor.8 6
This statement reaffirmed the Laski87 holding giving priority to the retained
percentages to the subcontractor.
In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Board of Water Comm'rs8 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, interpreting New York law, gave priority to retained
percentages of contract proceeds to laborers and materiahnen over the surety
by virtue of a "hold-harmless" clause in the contract running to the contractee
for the benefit of subcontractors.8 " Thus, the requirement of a payment bond 0
accomplished the same result as a "hold-harmless" clause and further guaranteed
the subcontractor's priority.
3. Summation: Surety v. Subcontractor
Since the majority of jurisdictions require a bond conditioned upon the
payment of the contractor's creditors,0 ' the subcontractor's priority over the
81. Id. at 336, 183 N.E. at 516.
82. See N.Y. Lien Law § 5.
83. This was in accord with N.Y. Lien Law § 21.
84. 235 App. Div. 712, 255 N.Y. Supp. 931 (1st Dep't 1932), affirming 139 Misc. 265, 247
N.Y. Supp. 4 (Sup. Ct. 1930).
85. 260 N.Y. at 339, 183 N.E. at 517 (1932).
86. Id. at 343, 183 N.E. at 519.
87. See note 77 supra.
88. 66 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1933).
89. Id. at 737.
90. N.Y. State Fin. Law § 137.
91. See note 72 supra.
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surety to retained percentages of progress payments, as evidenced by Wilson v.
Moon,0 2 would seem secure.03 That case, however, can be distinguished
from Stanton v. Babor-Comean, & Co.,94 where there was a provision in the
contract authorizing the contractee to declare the agreement null and void upon
a default by the contractor. Hence, when the contractor abandoned the work
and the contractee declared the contract void, the court held that by virtue
of this cancellation there was no sum to which the subcontractor's lien could
attach,95 and thus the surety prevailed. 0
There is a requirement in some jurisdictions that a lien must first be filed
before the claimant can collect on a payment bond.07 This, it has been said,
"defeats the advantages of bonding, which largely arise from the elimination of
the difficulties and ambiguities inherent in lien actions."Os All this confusion
could be resolved by following the rule laid down in American Stir. Co. v.
Westinghomse Elec. Mfg. Co.,99 namely, that although a payment bond surety's
right to the retained percentages is grounded on principles of subrogation, the
surety does not become subrogated to any rights until all claims of creditors
are fully satisfied.10
C. Surety v. Assignce
1. Contracts Governed by the Miller Act-Federal Contracts
It frequently happens that a contractor, after commencing work, finds it
necessary to secure additional capital to complete his contract. In such a case,
an assignment of the contractor's rights, especially the right to all moneys due
or to become due, will generally be demanded as security for any loan.
The validity of such assignment was provided for by the Assignment of
Claims Act of 1940.101 Prior to this, federal construction contractors were for-
bidden from offering such security to their creditors, and as a result, credit
was stifled. The 1940 legislation, to a large extent, cured this situation by
authorizing security assignments under certain conditions. From a surety's
point of view, the only restriction of any significance is that which limits the
making of such assignments to anyone other than a "bank, trust company or
other financing institution .... )
1 02
92. 240 App. Div. 440, 270 N.Y. Supp. S59 (4th Dep't), affd mem., 265 N.Y. 640, 193
N.E. 423 (1934).
93. See Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d S99, 901 (1953).
94. 168 Misc. 190, 6 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. CL 1933).
95. See note 6S supra.
96. 16S Mlisc. 190, 6 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 193S).
97. See note 73 supra.
93. Comment, 6S Yale L.J. 133, 165-66 (1958).
99. 296 U.S. 133 (1935).
100. Id. at 137.
101. 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1953).
102. 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1953). See Central Bank v.
United States, 345 U.S. 639, 644 (1953); Mfercantile Natl Bank v. United States, 2M F.2d
S32, 336-37 (CL C1. 1960).
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As a matter of course, a construction bond surety will obtain an assignment
of all moneys due under the contract as partial consideration for the bond.
Although prior in time to any assignment to secure a loan for working capital,
it is unenforceable against the Government, for the surety is not a financial
institution under the Assignment of Claims Act.10 3 It appears, therefore, that
the assignee who satisfies the provision of the act is entitled to a position of
priority. In Royal Indem. Co. v. United States,10 4 however, a payment bond
surety brought an action to obtain a preference in the payment of retained
percentages. 10 5 The contractor's assignee intervened, and it was determined
that the Assignment of Claims Act did not affect the relative rights of private
parties with respect to retained percentages of contract proceeds but rather
merely removed the prohibition on the assignment of claims against the Gov-
ernment. 10 6 After stating that the assignee's right to payment was conditioned on
the assignor-contractor's performance, 10 7 the court concluded that the surety
gained a preference in the order of payment which related back to the date
of the contract' 08
This case apparently disregarded the earlier decision of Coconut Grove Exch.
Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.109 which implied that a contractor's assignee
has priority to all moneys due under the contract. The court, in Coconut Grove,
stated that the Assignment of Claims Act,
while being primarily for the protection of the United States and not for the regula-
tion of the equities of the claimants, as between themselves, nevertheless, did in-
cidentally affect the rights between the assignee . . . and the surety so as to make
assignments to a bank from a contractor ... valid .... 110
Finding that the assignment to the bank was the only valid and legal assignment,
103. The assignee's right to payment is perfected by a written notice to the contracting
officer, the disbursing officer and the bond sureties. 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31
U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1958). See also Coconut Grove Exch. Bank v. New Amsterdam
Cas. Co., 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1945); Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 891
(Ct. CL. 1950).
104. 93 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
105. The court distinguished between a performance bond surety who becomes
subrogated to the Government's rights to apply the retained fund to the cost of completion,
and a payment bond surety who becomes subrogated to the subcontractor's equitable right
to priority of payment where the retained sum is disbursed by the stakeholder. 93 F. Supp.
at 896-97. In either event, the court reasoned that the surety would prevail. Id. at 897.
106. Id. at 896-97.
107. "It has been the holding of this court that an assignee under the 1940 Act acquires
no greater right in respect to amounts due under the contract than its assignor (the con-
tractor) had and that the right of the assignee to demand payment by the government of
an amount due from it for work performed under the contract was subject to performance
by the contractor of his contractual obligations." Id. at 895.
108. Accord, National Sur. Corp. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. CI.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 902 (1955).
109. 149 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1945).
110. Id. at 79.
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the court held that it took precedence over all prior assignments by the con-
tractor.
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand,"' limited the 1940 act to the
determination of the validity of assignments as against the Government and
thus held it to be ineffectual regarding the rights as between individuals. This
apparently was the basis for the decision in Royal Indemnity. Thus, taken on
their face, the two cases are in complete opposition to one another.
a. The 1951 Amendment to the Assignment of Claims Act
In 1951, the Assignment of Claims Act was amended to protect a contractor's
assignee from government set offs." 2 The amendment provided that the Gov-
ernment may not set off "any liability of the assignor on account of (1) re-
negotiation... (2) fines, (3) penalties.., or (4) taxes..., whether arising
from or independently of ... [the main] contract"" 3 against payments due an
assignee. This naturally resulted in easier financing for the contractor. By im-
plication, however, the amendment may have resolved the conflict between
Royal Indemnnity and Coconut Grove.
The word, "penalties," in subdivision three does not embrace "amounts which
may be collected or withheld from the assignor, in accordance with or for failure
to comply with the terms of the contract."'1 4 From this, it could be argued that
the Government may set off against the assignee money retained to insure
completion of the contract. Thus, a surety who completes a contractor's obliga-
tions would appear to be entitled to the retained percentages.
Newark Ins. Co. v. United States,"15 decided by the court of claims in 1960,
indicates another argument favoring a surety's priority to funds in the hands
of the Government. In this case, a surety brought suit against the Government
to recover money paid to an assignee bank on the theory that in so doing the
Government had made a mistake. In denying the bank's motion to dismiss a
cross claim against it, the court pointed out that the Assignment of Claims
Act "was enacted for the purpose of protecting the assignee.., in 'moneys due
or to become due under any contract.' "11 However, the court continued that
"the money ... was to become due only when the terms of the contract were
complied with by the contractor .... ,,11 Thus, in the absence of compliance
with the terms of the contract, the surety, upon carrying out its principal's
obligation, had "first call on any funds necessary for this purpose."1"8
In line with this rationale regarding sums retained by the Government are
American Fid. Co. v. National City Bank"O and Bank of Ariz. v. Nationat
111. Ibid.
112. 65 Stat. 41 (1951), 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1953).
113. 65 Stat. 41, 42 (1951), 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1958).
114. 65 Stat. 41, 42 (1951), 31 U.S.C. § 203 (1953). See also 35 DeLs. Comp. Gen. 14D
(1955).
115. 181 F. Supp. 246 (Ct. CI. 1960).
116. Id. at 248.
117. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
119. 266 F.2d 910, 914 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
1962] COMM11ENTS
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Sur. Corp.120 Unlike Newark, however, these cases held that the surety's right
of subrogation applied only to funds retained by the Government and not to
funds already paid on the contract.121 By implication, therefore, the interpreta-
tion of the act in Newark would deny an assignee the specific protection intended
by Congress.
2. Contracts Not Governed by the Miller Act-State and Municipal Contracts
It is necessary to divide any discussion regarding priority to retained contract
proceeds between a contractor's surety and his assignee (where the contract
is not governed by federal regulation) into two parts. Most jurisdictions, as
previously noted, require a performance bond' 2 2 and a payment bond 28 on all
construction contracts involving public buildings. In New York, the priority
to retained percentages as between the surety and the contractor's assignee
would appear to depend on the nature of the bond involved.124
a. The Performance Bond Surety
The leading case in determining the rights of the performance bond surety
and the contractor's assignee is Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United
States Fid. & Guar. Co.' 25 There, a performance bond surety was com-
pelled to complete a public construction contract after the contractor defaulted
and abandoned the work. Prior to abandonment, but after execution of the
bond, the contractor had assigned all moneys due or to become due under the
contract to the plaintiff bank.
The New York Court of Appeals held that the surety, upon completion of
the work in behalf of the State, "was subrogated to all the rights of the State
as against the contractor."' 26 Among these rights was the power to apply
retained percentages earned by the contractor prior to default toward com-
pletion of the contract. Since his rights are derivative, the assignee had
no greater rights than his assignor-contractor for, "if the State, as against the
contractor, could apply these earned moneys to the cost of completion, it could
do the same thing as against the assignee."' 27 The performance bond surety,
therefore, was awarded priority to the retained funds.
120. 237 F.2d 90, 93 (9th Cir. 1956).
121. American Fid. Co. v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d at 916; Bank of Ariz. v. Na-
tional Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d at 93-94.
122. See, e.g., N.Y. H'way Law § 38.
123. See, e.g., N.Y. State Fin. Law § 137.
124. The priority of a performance bond surety is not in dispute. See Scarsdale Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y. 159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934);
Hedley v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 267 App. Div. 800, 46 N.Y.S.2d 388 (4th Dep't 1943)
(memorandum decision), aff'd mem., 293 N.Y. 921, 60 N.E.2d 130 (1944). The payment
bond surety's priority, however, is doubtful. See Century Cement Mfg. Co. v. Fore, 264
App. Div. 475, 36 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dep't 1942) (dissenting opinion); see also State Bank
v. Dan-Bar Contracting Co., 23 Misc. 2d 487, 199 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
125. 264 N.Y. 159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934).
126. Id. at 163, 190 N.E. at 332.
127. Id. at 162-63, 190 N.E. at 331.
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Scarsdale and the decisions following it'2 9 secure the surety's priority in
situations where the surety has completed the contract in compliance with the
provisions of the contractor's performance bond. A different result, however,
would apparently be reached where the contest is between the contractor's
surety, whose claim is grounded on a payment bond, and the contractor's
assignee.
b. The Payment Bond Surety
In Hedley v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,'O the contract contained a provision
authorizing retention of money by the State for the purpose of paying sub-
contractors. After the work was completed by the contractor, a payment bond
surety had to step in and pay the outstanding claims of all lienors. The con-
tractor's assignee contended that its assignment was filed prior to the mechanics'
liens paid by the surety, and, therefore, was superior to the surety's claim based
on satisfaction of such liens.
In holding that the contractor and his assignee were both bound by the
terms of the contract, and that the former could not transfer anything to
which he was not entitled under the contract,'0 0 the court reasoned that the
contractor had obligated himself to pay all claims for labor and material. Thus,
when the surety executed the payment bond, it acquired an "equitable" Hen
(on moneys earned by the contractor and retained by the State) which was
superior to the assignee's lien.
The distinction between a performance bond and a payment bond was not
drawn by the court, 13 ' but rather it concluded that the contractor's right was
based on his contract. 32 If then, by reason of default, the contractor has no.
right, his assignee likewise can gain no enforceable right by reason of an assign-
ment.
The distinction between a performance bond and a payment bond surety
was initially raised in the dissenting opinion in Century Cemenat Mfg. Co. v.
Fiore,233 a three to two decision. In that case, the work was completed by the
State after the contractor's default, and the payment bond surety paid the
claims of the subcontractors after such completion. The surety and the con-
tractor's assignee then claimed the right to those funds withheld by the State.
The majority held that:
The execution of the bonds and the contract constituted in effect one single opera-
128. See Hedley -% New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 267 App. Div. SOD, 46 N.YSa.2d 3S&
(4th Dep't 1943) (memorandum decision); Century Cement Alfg. Co. v. Fiore, 264 App. Div.
475, 36 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dep't 1942); State Bank v. Dan-Bar Contracting Co., 23 IML-c.
2d 487, 199 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
129. 267 App. Div. SCO, 46 N.Y.S.2d 3SS.
130. Id. at SOO, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 389-90. See also Scarsdale Natl Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y. 159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934).
131. 267 App. Div. at S00, 46 N.Y.S.2d at 38S.
132. Id. at 800, 46 N.S.2d at 3S9-90. The contractor's rights came from his contract,
and that right is one to receive the contract price if he completes the contract and pays
all claims. If he fails to do so and the cost exceeds the balance due under the contract,
then the contractor has no property right.
133. 264 App. Div. 475, 36 N.Y.S.2d 332 (3d Dep't 1942).
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tion. . . [An] assignee . . . is bound by the obligations to which a contractor has
committed himself in obtaining the contract. Those obligations include payment to
materialmen and laborers.134
Thus, the court reasoned that although the surety did not "literally" complete
the contract, it did make the payments necessary for its completion, including
the liquidation of all claims.135 Hence, it awarded priority to the surety.
The dissent, 136 on the other hand, drew a distinction between a performance
bond and a payment bond. While admitting a surety's priority through subroga-
tion when it has completed work under a performance bond,137 it denied this
priority where a payment bond was involved. It reasoned that the payment
bond surety does not discharge any obligation of the State, for the State has
no obligation to pay subcontractors. Subrogation, therefore, is not involved.' 38
Priority as to the retained percentages is thus controlled by the lien law, 13 9
and under its provisions, an assignee whose assignment is duly filed prior to a
notice of lien has priority.140 Since the assignee's assignment was filed prior in
time, the dissent concluded that the assignee should prevail.
This reasoning was the basis for a New York decision, State Bank v. Dan-Bar
Contracting Co.,141 where an assignee whose assignment was filed prior to the
lien of a payment bond surety was given priority under the lien law. 1'42 The
court distinguished Hedley v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.143 on the ground that
there the contractual obligation to pay the claims of all subcontractors was
assumed by the contractor. In the absence of such a provision, it held that a
surety which has satisfied the outstanding claims of subcontractors, after the
work has been completed either by the contractor or the State, has no rights
to which it may become subrogated and, thus, the contest between this surety
and the contractor's assignee must be decided by the provisions of the lien
law.144
3. Summation: Surety v. Assignee
Most courts, in dealing with federal construction contracts, apparently do
not distinguish between a performance bond and a payment bond when the
134. Id. at 479, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 335-36.
135. Id. at 480, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 336.
136. Ibid.
137. Ibid.
138. Id. at 481, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 337.
139. N.Y. Lien Law § 25(1).
140. "Except as provided in section five an assignee of moneys, or any part thereof, due
,or to become due under a contract for public improvement, whose assignment is duly
filed prior to the filing of a notice of lien or assignment of every other party to the
action, shall have priority over those parties to the extent of advances made upon such
assignment before the filing of the notice of lien or assignment next subsequent to his
assignment . . . ." N.Y. Lien Law § 25(1).
141. 23 Misc. 2d 487, 199 N.Y.S.2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
142. See note 140 supra.
143. 267 App. Div. 800, 46 N.Y.S.2d 388.
144. See note 140 supra.
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surety is claiming priority over a contractor's assignee to the retained contract
proceeds.' 1 5 The principal difficulty appears in the interpretation given the
Assignment of Claims Act146 and its 1951 amendment.1" 7 Most of the recent
cases14s -view the act as merely removing the prohibition against the assignment
of funds due on government contracts without affecting the relative rights of
the parties.'4 9 Thus, the surety, by virtue of its prior equity,'50 will prevail.
On the other hand, in the administration of funds withheld under state con-
tracts, a distinction is drawn between performance and payment bonds. The
surety who completes work under a performance bond is unequivocally given
priority,'' while the payment bond surety appears to be in quite a different
position.' 52 It has been held that a surety who pays the contractor's creditors
after completion of the work by some other party, performs no service to the
State' 53 and, therefore, has no rights to which it may become subrogated. The
surety's rights then become dependent upon the provisions of the lien law.
This latter argument appears unsound in light of the obligation of the con-
tractor to furnish a payment bond as a prerequisite to the award of a public
contract.1 4 The reasoning of the majority in Ccntzury Cm nent Mfg. Co. v.
Fiore,'15 that a contract is not complete until all creditors are paid,,ru is more
reasonable. By liquidation of these claims, clearly the surety performs a service
for the State, and hence should become subrogated to its rights in the retained
funds.
III. CONCLUSION
It is apparent that a surety, by virtue of statutory developments and judicial
interpretation, has been placed at a distinct disadvantage. This is unfair in light
of the necessary and valid service it performs.
The most desirable solution to the contest for priority to retained contract
proceeds would appear to lie in a return to equitable principles. The surety
should prevail over the government-federal, state and local-where the latter's
claim does not arise out of the immediate contract. Similarly, the surety should
prevail over a subsequent assignee who necessarily tahes with notice of the
145. See, e.g., Royal Indem. Co. v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 891 (CL CL 1950).
146. 54 Stat. 1029 (1940), as amended, 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1953).
147. 65 Stat. 41 (1951), 31 U.S.C. § 203, 41 U.S.C. § 15 (1953).
14S. American Fid. Co. v. National City Bank, 266 F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1959);
Bank of Ariz. x% National Sur. Corp., 237 F.2d 90, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Ner,-ark Ins. Co.
v. United States, 181 F. Supp. 246 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
149. Ibid.
150. The surety's equity arises upon execution of the bond and is thus superior to the
assignee's equity which arises upon the assignment.
151. See Scarsdale Natl Bank & Trust Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y.
159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934).
152. See State Bank v. Dan-Bar Contracting Co., 23 isc. 2d 437, 199 N.Y.S.2d 3G9
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
153. Ibid.
154 See N.Y. State Fin. Law § 137.
155. 264 App. Div. 475, 36 N.Y.S.2d 332.
156. Id. at 479, 36 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
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